Does better labour standard compliance pay? Linking labour standard compliance and supplier competitiveness by Oka, Chikako
Better Work Discussion Paper Series: No. 5
Does Better Labour Standard Compliance Pay?
Linking Labour Standard Compliance and
Supplier Competitiveness
 
Chikako Oka
March 2012
BETTER WORK DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DOES BETTER LABOUR STANDARD COMPLIANCE PAY?  
LINKING LABOUR STANDARD COMPLIANCE AND SUPPLIER COMPETITIVENESS 
 
 
 
Chikako Oka 
Royal Holloway University of London 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 2012 
 
 Copyright © International Labour Organization (ILO) and International Finance Corporation (IFC) 2012 
First published 2012 
 
Publications of the ILO enjoy copyright under Protocol 2 of the Universal Copyright Convention. Nevertheless, 
short excerpts from them may be reproduced without authorization, on condition that the source is indicated. 
For rights of reproduction or translation, application should be made to the ILO, acting on behalf of both 
organizations: ILO Publications (Rights and Permissions), International Labour Office, CH-1211 Geneva 22, 
Switzerland, or by email: pubdroit@ilo.org. The IFC and ILO welcome such applications. 
Libraries, institutions and other users registered with reproduction rights organizations may make copies in 
accordance with the licences issued to them for this purpose. Visit www.ifrro.org to find the reproduction 
rights organization in your country. 
  
 
 
Oka, Chikako 
 
Does better work labour standard compliance pay? Linking labour standard compliance and supplier 
competitiveness / Chikako Oka ; International Labour Office. - Geneva: ILO, 2012 
31 p. (Better work discussion paper ; No.5) 
 
 
ISBN: 9789221261445(print); 9789221261452 (web pdf) 
 
International Labour Office 
 
labour standards / ILO standards / competitiveness / working conditions / value chains / clothing industry / 
textile industry / Cambodia 
 
04.01.6 
 ILO Cataloguing in Publication Data 
 
 
  
 
The designations employed in this, which are in conformity with United Nations practice, and the presentation 
of material therein do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the IFC or ILO 
concerning the legal status of any country, area or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation 
of its frontiers. 
The responsibility for opinions expressed in signed articles, studies and other contributions rests solely with 
their authors, and publication does not constitute an endorsement by the IFC or ILO of the opinions expressed 
in them.  
Reference to names of firms and commercial products and processes does not imply their endorsement by the 
IFC or ILO, and any failure to mention a particular firm, commercial product or process is not a sign of 
disapproval. 
ILO publications can be obtained through major booksellers or ILO local offices in many countries, or direct 
from ILO Publications, International Labour Office, CH-1211 Geneva 22, Switzerland. Catalogues or lists of 
new publications are available free of charge from the above address, or by email: pubvente@ilo.org 
Visit our website: www.ilo.org/publns 
 
  
 
Printed by ILO 
 
Abstract 
 
Faced with growing demands for responsibility in global supply chains, multinational 
companies are increasingly regulating labour and other conditions of their suppliers 
through codes of conduct and monitoring. While research in this area has been expanding 
rapidly, the link between labour standard compliance and competitiveness of supplier firms 
remains unexplored. This paper seeks to fill the gap by examining whether the supplier’s 
level of labour compliance affects its likelihood of attracting and retaining buyers. Based on 
original survey and panel data from Cambodia’s garment sector, the paper shows that 
better labour standard compliance is a necessary condition for producing for reputation-
conscious buyers but not a sufficient condition for attracting them. Other criteria such as 
price, quality, and delivery time are driving buyers’ sourcing decisions. Nevertheless, 
producing for a certain buyer type and respecting certain labour standards increases the 
supplier’s likelihood of retaining buyers, which is critical to the supplier’s competitiveness. 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The author would like to thank an anonymous reviewer, Rafael Gomez, Jee Young Kim, and 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the past decade, the focus of the debate concerning labour standards appears to 
have shifted from the desirability to the efficacy of various forms of labour regulation, 
notably private and non-governmental schemes in global supply chains (Sabel et al., 2001; 
Elliot and Freeman, 2003; Weil 2005; Barrientos and Smith, 2007; Locke et al. 2007). While 
the burgeoning literature has examined various means by which labour conditions can be 
improved in global supply chains, the link between labour standard compliance and 
competitiveness of supplier firms has received little attention.  
The lack of research in this area is partly explained by the fact that scholars studying 
the subject tended to focus on the plight of workers toiling under dismal conditions and 
various means to regulate unscrupulous firms rather than ways to motivate firms to 
improve labour conditions (e.g. Esbenshade, 2004; Seidman, 2008). Another reason behind 
the dearth of studies linking labour standards and competitiveness lies in the difficulties in 
accessing the firm-level data on working conditions and productivity in global supply chains. 
Considering that many supplier firms still view labour standard compliance solely as a cost, 
it is of great importance to examine whether and to what extent improving labour 
conditions can also help enhance supplier competitiveness.  
This paper looks at the nexus between labour standard compliance of supplier firms 
and their potential for attracting and retaining buyers. For supplier firms to survive and 
prosper, it is important to attract and retain buyers, in particular those that give sufficient 
margins and continuous orders. In the apparel industry, buyers are increasingly 
concentrated and competition among suppliers all over the world has intensified, putting 
constant downward pressures on price (Hurley and Miller, 2005). Moreover, as the industry 
is marked by seasonal volatility, lack of orders during low seasons could be detrimental to 
the survival of supplier firms. Having a long-term relationship with buyers can help smooth 
out these risks. The question then is whether and to what extent better compliance 
increases the supplier’s chance of attracting and retaining such buyers.  
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To shed light on these issues, this study uses two sets of data. First is a self-designed 
survey of 14 major buyers conducted by the author in 2008 that asked detailed questions 
regarding the process and mechanism of controlling labour standard compliance of 
suppliers. Second, firm-level data of nearly 400 firms in Cambodia’s garment sector from 
2006 to 2010 was obtained from Better Factories Cambodia (BFC), operated by the 
International Labour Organization (ILO). BFC has been monitoring Cambodia’s garment 
export factories since 2001 with a view to encouraging continuous improvement.1 One of 
the unique features of the program is that BFC monitors can access to virtually all exporting 
garment factories in the country as the Cambodian government requires all garment 
factories seeking export licenses to submit to BFC monitoring. Such unprecedented access 
and comprehensive data give an excellent opportunity to explore the link between labour 
standard compliance and competitiveness of supplier firms. 
The next section considers the nexus between labour standard compliance and firm 
performance. Section III discusses the result of the buyer survey to understand how buyers 
try to ensure the level of labour standard compliance in their supplier factories. Section IV 
builds a conceptual framework to understand how buyer types may influence the process 
of attracting and retaining buyers. Section V describes the data and measures while Section 
VI discusses the regression results. The last section concludes that labour standard 
compliance and competitiveness of supplier firms appear to be linked in a rather nuanced 
and subtle manner.  
  
                                                 
1
More information about Better Factories Cambodia can be found on their website: 
http://www.betterfactories.org  
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II. LABOUR STANDARD COMPLIANCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
Labour standard compliance can potentially affect the supplier firm’s performance 
both negatively and positively. Supplier firms often grumble about the cost of compliance 
negatively affecting their bottom-line and their claim is not without evidence. Based on 
firm-level survey data from 16 developing countries, Maskus et al. (2005) showed that the 
investment cost to comply with various technical standards (e.g. safety, environment) 
imposed by importing countries significantly increased start-up and production costs. This 
is likely to apply to labour standards as well. Stigzelius and Mark-Herbert (2009) found that 
Indian garment manufacturers that implemented SA8000, a workplace and human rights 
standards developed by Social Accountability International, faced increased labour and 
investment cost as they were obliged to reduce overtime and improve facilities. 
If buyers enforcing their codes of conduct pay for the cost of compliance by offering 
compliant suppliers premium prices or increased orders, suppliers can recover the cost of 
compliance. In reality, however, such burden sharing practice is almost non-existent in the 
global apparel industry (Locke et al., 2009). Ruwanpura and Wrigley (2011) find that high 
levels of labour standard compliance among Sri Lanka’s apparel manufacturers are neither 
rewarded through higher prices nor offered guaranteed business.   
Notwithstanding such lack of support from buyers, the cost of compliance may be 
offset by positive effects of better working conditions and respect for human rights 
through higher productivity. According to the human capital theory, workers require 
investment and maintenance just as physical capital (Becker, 1975). Hence, firms can 
improve performance through investing in employees and encouraging them to acquire 
knowledge and skills. Moreover, better treatment of workers should motivate employees 
and make them more loyal and cooperative, contributing to productivity (Pheffer, 2007).   
Growing empirical studies suggest that human resource innovations (e.g. selection, 
incentives, training, job enrichment, participation, teamwork, job security etc.) have 
positive impacts on firm performance (e.g. Ichinowski et al., 1997; Shaw, 2006). Factory 
managers may well see productivity-enhancing effects of complying with labour standards 
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through increased worker motivation and consistent effort or other efficiency gains. Locke 
and Romis (2007) showed that a garment factory that trained and empowered workers had 
higher productivity than the other otherwise similar factory through a matched pair case 
study in Mexico. Robertson et al. (2011) argue that such efficiency gains from HR 
innovations may well be behind the broad-based progress in labour standard compliance in 
Cambodia’s garment sector.  
There is potentially another channel by which labour standards and competitiveness 
of supplier firms may be linked and yet overlooked: attracting and retaining buyers. We can 
think of at least two ways in which compliant suppliers may attract and retain buyers. First, 
buyers may prefer sourcing from better compliant suppliers to safeguard their reputation. 
Those buyers that derive most of their profits from branding are dependent on image and 
social legitimacy, which can be easily tarnished by negative publicity surrounding dismal 
working conditions and child labour in their supply chains. Hence, those reputation-
conscious buyers are more likely to carefully select and monitor their suppliers to minimize 
potential problems and to safeguard their reputation (Oka, 2010a).  
Second, buyers may also be attracted to compliant suppliers for reasons other than 
labour standard compliance per se. If indeed better compliance helps improve productivity, 
buyers should be attracted to those productive suppliers that can offer better quality for 
competitive prices. Hence, more compliant suppliers can potentially attract and retain 
buyers directly through reputation concerns and indirectly through productivity gains.  
Figure 1 summarizes the potential channels linking the supplier’s labour standard 
compliance and competitiveness. To achieve compliance, supplier firms are likely to incur 
cost, which is not compensated by their buyers. This would translate to reduced margins 
for suppliers if they avoid passing the cost of compliance on to buyers. If they do, their 
prices become less competitive and they are likely to lose business. Either way, the cost of 
compliance negatively affects supplier competitiveness. On the other hand, better 
compliance can help improve productivity, which would enable the supplier firm to offer 
better quality products for competitive prices, leading to increased business. Moreover, 
compliant firms may be in a better position to attract and retain buyers than less compliant 
firms because of reputation concerns of their buyers.  
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Figure 1. Potential channels linking labor standard compliance and competitiveness of supplier 
firms 
 
While there is growing literature exploring the link between buyers and labour 
conditions of supplier firms, there has been no systematic study yet that looks specifically 
at how the supplier’s labour compliance may affect its likelihood of attracting and retaining 
buyers. Existing research has focused on particular brands and whether and how brands 
can encourage their suppliers to improve labour conditions (Frenkel and Scott, 2002; Locke 
and Romis 2007; Locke et al. 2007). Oka (2010a) shows factories producing for reputation-
conscious buyers systematically outperform other factories with regard to labour standard 
compliance in Cambodia’s garment sector. Robertson et al. (2011) corroborated the 
findings across various labour standards. Yet, they did not assess whether and how labour 
standard compliance may affect buyer variables, which is the focus of this paper. 
III. BUYER SURVEY RESULTS 
 
To better understand how buyers try to monitor and control the level of supplier 
compliance, the author conducted a buyer survey on 9-10 October 2008 in Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia during the Buyers Forum, a bi-annual event where major buyer representatives 
gather to exchange views with other buyers and stakeholders and to build consensus. In 
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total, 14 responses from compliance staff were collected, of which 9 BFC member buyers, 4 
non-BFC buyers, and 1 sourcing agent.2  These 13 buyers account for 45 percent of 
Cambodia’s garment export value.  
This survey complements the Cambodia Buyer Survey conducted in 2004 by Foreign 
Investment Advisory Service (FIAS), which sought to gauge the importance of labour 
standard issues in buyers’ sourcing decisions.3 The survey targeted senior sourcing staff 
from 15 of the largest US and EU buyers accounting for about 45 percent of Cambodia’s 
garment exports. One of the key results of the FIAS survey was that labour standards 
figured prominently in buyers’ decisions in selecting a country to source from, although it 
had to be balanced with traditional sourcing criteria such as price, quality, and delivery 
time. This survey complements the FIAS survey by asking detailed questions regarding the 
process and mechanism of controlling the level of labour standard compliance in supplier 
firms. 
Buyer responses reported in Table 1 show that all of the surveyed buyers check 
compliance levels of their potential supplier factories before placing orders and rate 
compliance performance of existing supplier factories, showing buyers’ great attention to 
labour standard issues. Almost all the buyers use the compliance rating to identify poor 
performers rather than good performers, confirming that buyers tend to use sticks rather 
than carrots to reduce labour standard violations in their supply chains. This is consistent 
with others’ findings that suppliers’ better compliance is not rewarded by buyers through 
increased orders (Ruwanpura and Wrigley, 2011). 
 
                                                 
2
 With the assistance of ILO-BFC, the author distributed questionnaires to 16 participating buyer 
representatives, of which 12 returned completed forms during the forum. Subsequently, the author contacted 15 
other buyers who did not participate in the forum, of which 2 completed the questionnaire on-line. 
3
 FIAS is a joint facility of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the World Bank. The FIAS Buyer 
survey results can be found here: http://www.betterfactories.org/content/documents/ 
Cambodia%20Corporate%20Social%20Responsibility.pdf 
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Table 1. Responses to the buyer survey regarding labour standard compliance of supplier factories 
Survey Questions Number Valid Missing 
1. Compliance Check       
Does your company check compliance levels of factories before placing orders?  14 0 
    Yes 12     
    Partially Yes 2     
    No 0     
2. Compliance Rating     
2-a. Does your company rate compliance performance of supplier factories? 14 0  
    Yes 14     
    No  0     
2-b. If yes to above, how does your company use the rating? 
        (multiple answers possible) 
  13 1 
      
    To identify poor performers and encourage them to improve 13     
    To identify very poor performers and reduce/cancel orders 3     
    To identify good performers and reward them with more orders 2     
3. Monitoring Procedure       
Which procedure, if any, does your company use to ensure an acceptable level 
of compliance at supplier factories? (multiple answers possible) 
      
  13 1 
    Zero Tolerance 6     
    Three Strikes 6     
    Continuous Improvement 7     
4. Warning       
4-a. How often does your company issue warnings to supplier factories in 
Cambodia that certain non-compliance leads to cancellation of orders? 
  13 1 
      
    Often 1     
    Sometimes 6     
    Rarely 5     
    Never 1     
4-b. If yes to above, regarding which issues? (multiple answers possible) 9 5 
    Child labour, Forced labour 5     
    Wage 4     
    Contract 3     
    Overtime, Disputes/Strikes, FoA, Welfare 2     
    Leave, Safety & Health, Discrimination 1     
5. Cancellation of Orders       
Has your company ever cancelled orders because of compliance problems in 
Cambodia? 
  14 0 
      
    Yes 4     
    No 10     
 
As for the monitoring procedure, all the surveyed buyers have some kind of 
procedure to ensure an acceptable level of compliance. “Zero tolerance” means that 
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violations of certain standards, often fundamental issues such as child labour lead to 
immediate cancellation of orders. “Three strikes” suggests that factories are required to 
achieve an acceptable level of compliance in three audits, or they lose orders. “Continuous 
improvement” indicates that buyers work closely with factories to solve problems on a 
continuous basis. Some buyers combine different procedures.  
The surveyed buyers occasionally issue warnings to supplier factories that certain 
non-compliance leads to cancellation of orders and such warnings mainly concerned child 
labour, forced (or involuntary) labour, wage and contract issues. Nonetheless, cancellation 
of orders due to non-compliance is a rare event. Only four buyers have ever resorted to 
this option, of which one buyer temporarily withheld orders in Cambodia. This lack of 
consequences in the event of violations is not specific to Cambodia. Locke et al. (2009: 326) 
call it “an open secret” that very few buyers exit supplier factories because of non-
compliance with the codes of conduct. 
In sum, the buyer survey results show that major buyers concerned about labor 
conditions in their supplier firms try to control the level of compliance through pre-order 
sorting and post-order monitoring.4 As shown in Figure 2, buyers check the compliance 
level of their potential suppliers before placing orders and select suppliers based on their 
criteria (pre-order sorting). When factories do not pass an initial audit, most buyers require 
them to provide a corrective action plan and submit themselves for follow-up visits. Once 
the compliance level is deemed acceptable and orders are placed, supplier factories will be 
regularly monitored to ascertain whether suppliers continue to satisfy the required 
standards (post-order monitoring).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 In the context of regulating the US garment industry, Weil and Mallo (2007: 807) distinguish between the 
sorting effect, where manufacturers seek to match themselves with better complying contractors ex ante and 
the direct effect, where manufacturers try to make their contractors more compliant through monitoring.  
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Figure 2.   Pre-order sorting and post-order monitoring 
 
                 
If the supplier factory continues to satisfy the buyer in terms of compliance as well as 
other criteria (e.g. price, quality, delivery), the factory continues to receive orders. 
Otherwise, in theory, the factory will lose orders and need to go through the pre-order 
sorting process again. In reality, however, once orders have been placed, except for 
egregious violations, labour compliance rarely affects buyers’ sourcing decisions, as 
confirmed by the survey. Non-compliance with codes of conduct is often overlooked partly 
because buyers’ compliance staff has less influence than sourcing colleagues when they 
decide whether or not to continue buying from a non-compliant factory (Locke et al. 2009). 
There is also a switching cost associated with changes in suppliers. Hence, buyers have 
more leverage before placing orders in influencing supplier behaviour and selecting more 
compliant suppliers than after placing orders.    
 One of the limitations of this buyer survey is a small and non-representative sample. 
Given that most respondents are BFC members and participants in the Buyers’ Forum, 
these buyers are likely to be more concerned about labour conditions in their supply chains 
than the average buyers sourcing from Cambodia. Thus, the survey responses are likely to 
be biased toward buyers’ active involvement. Second, this type of surveys asking buyers 
how they implement codes of conduct is unlikely to be able to distinguish between policies 
and actual practices, which are often decoupled. These limitations notwithstanding, the 
survey highlights that i) even those buyers concerned about suppliers’ labour conditions 
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rarely reward compliant suppliers through increased orders and ii) that these buyers rarely 
terminate orders because of non-compliance.    
IV. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The process of attracting and retaining buyers can be conceptualized in three stages: 
(i) mode of transaction, (ii) sorting, and (iii) relationship formation. First, given a 
combination of sourcing criteria (price, quality, delivery time, as well as labour and other 
standards), buyers decide whether to transact directly with their supplier firms or indirectly 
through sourcing agents (in some cases, buyers use both channels). Second, buyers or 
agents select supplier firms based on their sourcing criteria. Third, once the buyer and the 
supplier enters a business relationship, the duration can vary from one season to a number 
of years, depending on the extent to which the supplier continues to satisfy the buyer’s 
needs.  
The process of attracting and retaining buyers is likely to differ depending on the type 
of buyers a supplier is dealing with. Buyer types in the apparel industry can be broadly 
classified into two types: specialty retailers and mass merchandisers. Specialty retailers 
specialize in certain apparel products and target certain market segments (e.g. H&M, Nike) 
whereas mass merchandisers offer a variety of products including non-apparel products 
and appeal to the mass market (e.g. Target, Wal-Mart). The two buyer types differ notably 
in terms of product categories. Products can be broadly classified as functional products 
that have long product life cycles such as basic clothing and innovative products that have 
short life cycles such as fashion apparel (Lee, 2002). Specialty retailers tend to specialize in 
innovative products while mass merchandisers tend to focus on basic functional products 
and this has important implications for quality requirements, nature and duration of 
relationships, and profit margins for suppliers. 
In the first stage, buyers choose the mode of transaction based on the level of 
standards required. According to Transaction Cost Economics, when a transaction requires 
a higher degree of asset specificity, or non-transferable investment in one’s partner, this 
raises switching cost and the risk of opportunism in the absence of safeguards (Williamson, 
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1975 & 1985). Thus, buyers requiring stringent quality and labour standards are likely to 
prefer vertical integration (hierarchy) than arms’-lengths relationships (market). 
Nonetheless, growth of global outsourcing in labour-intensive industries like apparel has 
made vertical integration less viable as firms started to source from contractors around the 
world. Hence, the middle ground between hierarchy and market, namely strategic alliances 
have become popular as a good compromise, which Williamson (1991) call hybrid.  
On the one hand, buyers can better control supplier opportunism (i.e. in this case 
non-compliance with required standards such as codes of conduct) through direct 
transactions with suppliers than through indirect transactions via sourcing agents. On the 
other hand, sourcing agents can quickly find the cheapest suppliers that satisfy the buyer’s 
conditions. Given the relative advantages, buyers that require stringent standards tend to 
prefer direct transactions while buyers with more emphasis on price and quantity prefer 
using sourcing agents (Oka, 2010b). Accordingly, specialty retailers with rigorous standard 
requirements are likely to prefer a direct relationship with suppliers while mass 
merchandisers with emphasis on price and quantity are likely to transact indirectly through 
sourcing agents.  
In the second stage of supplier sorting, buyers or agents select suppliers based on 
their sourcing criteria. While mass merchandisers are more demanding in terms of price, 
specialty retailers tend to place more weight on quality and delivery time. In addition to 
these traditional sourcing criteria, buyers increasingly demand their suppliers to satisfy 
labour, environmental, and other standards. As shown earlier in the buyer survey, most 
buyers check the level of labour standard of candidate suppliers. 
In the third stage of relationship formation, buyers requiring more stringent 
standards are likely to favour a long-term relationship for the same reason they prefer a 
direct transaction: better controlling supplier opportunism through repeated transactions. 
Switching cost is higher especially for those buyers who select their suppliers carefully and 
invest in the relationship. On the other hand, the supplier’s relationship with mass 
merchandisers is likely to be shorter as mass merchandisers often rely on agents to pick 
suppliers from one season to another, making it difficult to form a long-term relationship.  
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Profit margins also vary with buyer types. The gaps in margins are partly explained by 
product types as functional products have lower profit margins than innovative products 
(Lee, 2002). Moreover, mass merchandisers can use their market power to drive down 
supplier margins. For instance, studies have shown that suppliers of Wal-Mart had lower 
profit margins compared to other suppliers (Bloom and Perry, 2001; Mottner and Smith, 
2009). This is confirmed by field-based interviews conducted by the author as one manager 
of a factory supplying Nike said that they would not consider producing for Wal-Mart as 
margins would be too low.  
In sum, the supplier’s likelihood of attracting and retaining is likely to be moderated 
by buyer types as they have different requirements and preferences. Given the stringent 
standards required, specialty retailers are likely to be harder to attract than mass 
merchandisers. On the other hand, once a business relationship starts, specialty retailers 
are likely to stay longer in the relationship than mass merchandisers, who tend to switch 
suppliers more frequently. Moreover, specialty retailers give better profit margins than 
mass merchandisers.    
V. DATA AND MEASURES 
 
This section operationalizes concepts to answer the following questions: (i) Are pre-
order selection criteria different between specialty retailers and mass merchandisers? (ii) 
Do better complying factories (i.e. violating fewer labour standards) attract more 
reputation-conscious buyers? (iii) Are compliant factories better able to retain buyers? 
The data for this study draw on the firm-level data collected by ILO BFC. Pairs of BFC 
monitors conduct un-announced visits of all exporting garment factories every 8 months on 
average. While monitoring started in 2001, the data have been systematically stored only 
since December 2005. Thus, this study covers the data from December 2005 to December 
2010. During this period, 1868 factory inspections were conducted for a total of 396 
factories. In addition to the compliance data, BFC collects information on firm 
characteristics such as the number of employees, unions, country of ownership, as well as 
the name of buyers sourcing from the factories. 
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COMPLIANCE MEASURES 
BFC monitors assess nearly 400 checklist items of labour standards, which are based 
on the Cambodian labour law and the international core labour standards. These are 
grouped into the following categories: contracts, wages, hours, leave, welfare, 
occupational safety and health (OSH), labour relations, and fundamental rights. Given that 
monitored standards for hours and leave are few and that they measure similar issues (i.e. 
the number of hours/days worked), they are combined together to form one category, 
hours-leave. Similarly, welfare is joined with OSH to form OSH-welfare, as welfare has only 
few monitored standards and the majority of them are closely related to OSH (e.g. drinking 
water and toilets). Fundamental rights need to be treated separately since violation of 
fundamental rights occurs only rarely, but one incidence of non-compliance has serious 
implications. Hence, non-compliance of fundamental rights is measured by a binary 
variable (whether or not violation occurred) rather than a continuous variable (how many 
violations occurred). 
As for monitoring procedures, un-announced visits span an entire day. The process 
includes on-site inspection, meetings with human resource managers, union leaders, and 
shop stewards as well as interviews with workers. Monitors collect copies of pay slips and 
hour records for verification. BFC monitors assess each checklist item and determine 
whether a factory complies with a specified standard or not. Figure 3 shows the evolution 
of compliance rates, where a 100 indicates a full compliance for the category. While we can 
observe overall progress across issue areas, some violations remain stubbornly common, 
notably excessive overtime.    
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Figure 3. Evolution of compliance rates by issue category 
 
BUYER VARIABLES 
As monitoring is industry-wide, compliance and basic firm characteristic data are 
available for all exporting garment factories, but this is not the case for buyer variables. As 
of now, 22 buyers have joined BFC, which make up more than half of Cambodia’s garment 
export volume. As others have not joined, however, BFC does not possess complete 
information about which buyer is sourcing from which factory. Moreover, some buyers 
joined BFC later, making it difficult to analyse their relationship with suppliers over time. To 
circumvent this problem, this study limits the analysis to seven specialty retailers and three 
mass merchandisers, who have been BFC members since 2006.  
All of the buyers included in the sample are globally famous buyers who have 
invested in corporate social responsibility efforts, so I call them reputation-conscious 
buyers. But, the degree of reputation-consciousness is likely to vary. For instance, while all 
of them joined BFC at the outset, not all of them have joined other highly regarded multi-
stakeholder initiatives such as the Fair Labor Association (FLA) and the Ethical Trading 
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Initiative (ETI).5 Buyers join these initiatives to show their commitment to better working 
conditions and to safeguard their reputation, so the membership signals a high degree of 
reputation-consciousness.  In fact, all the seven specialty retailers are members of either 
the FLA or the ETI while none of the three mass merchandisers are. 
To evaluate the compliance pattern of suppliers producing for different buyer types, 
the following buyer dummies have been created. A specialty retailer dummy takes the 
value of one if the observation belongs to a supplier producing for an original BFC buyer 
classified as a specialty retailer, and zero otherwise. A mass merchandiser dummy is 
created in the similar manner. There is some overlap, suggesting that some factories 
produce for both types of buyers. As for the duration of buyer-supplier relationship, it is 
considered “long” when the relationship lasted at least from 2006 to 2010, covering the 
entire period of this study. 
To measure the levels of labour compliance required by different buyer types, it is 
important to separate pre-order sorting effect from post-order monitoring effect. 
Specifically, observations where a supplier entered into a business relationship with a 
buyer for the first time have been labelled as “new” supplier observations.6 Figure 4 shows 
the average compliance rate of new suppliers by buyer types. It shows that new suppliers 
of specialty retailers have better overall compliance rate than new suppliers of mass 
merchandisers. Moreover, both types outperform suppliers of other buyers who were not 
original BFC members. This confirms the assumption that reputation-conscious buyers, 
specialty retailers in particular choose more compliant suppliers than other buyer types.  
 
                                                 
5
 See Oka (2010a) for discussion on the FLA and the ETI. 
6
 As there is no buyer information prior to 2006, those suppliers that already produced for the original BFC 
buyers in 2006 are considered as pre-existing suppliers. 
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Figure 4. Average compliance rates of new suppliers by buyer types 
 
 
Table 2 provides the summary statistics regarding the number of non-compliance 
items for different buyer and supplier variables. We can observe that fewer numbers of 
violations are reported for suppliers of specialty retailers (27.3) than those of mass 
merchandisers (32) but the latter is still better than the full sample average (37.9). New 
suppliers of specialty retailers violate fewer items (23.5) than the average, which is not 
surprising as newer factories tend to be more compliant. 55 percent of observations 
belonging to the suppliers of specialty retailers are in long-term relationships, compared to 
23 percent for the suppliers of mass merchandisers, confirming the different preferences of 
buyers. Generally, suppliers in long-term relationship have fewer violations than the 
average.  
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Table 2. Summary statistics of buyer and supplier variables  
    
Number of non-
compliance items 
Number of 
Observations 
Share (%) 
     
Full Sample 37.9 1959 100 
     
Limited Sample (suppliers of original BFC buyers)   
Suppliers of specialty retailers   
 All suppliers (average) 27.3 509 26.0 
 of which    
 New suppliers 23.5 81 15.9 
     
 Long-term relationship 25.7 280 55.0 
     
Suppliers of mass merchandisers   
 All suppliers (average) 32 745 38.0 
 of which    
 New suppliers 32.1 191 25.6 
     
  Long-term relationship 29 171 23.0 
  
For regressions, other firm characteristics known to affect the level of compliance are 
also considered, namely the size and age of the firm, foreign ownership, and the number of 
unions in the establishment. The firm size is measured by the number of employees in the 
establishment. The age of the firm is measured by the number of monitoring visits by the 
ILO since 2001, given the lack of original data and the regular interval of monitoring visits.  
VI. REGRESSIONS 
 
In order to assess whether better complying factories attract more reputation-
conscious buyers, I estimate an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) with fixed effects. Fixed effects 
are appropriate as they use the time-series dimension of panel data to measure the 
expected change in the dependent variable given a unit change in an independent variable 
within cases (i.e. factory in this case). Moreover, fixed effects control for omitted or 
unobservable variables that differ among firms but remain stable over time, including firm 
strategy (Hsiao, 2003). Given the data limitation, the sample is limited to those factories 
that produced at least once for original BFC member buyers. To focus on the effect of non-
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compliance items on buyer numbers (not the other way around), the non-compliance 
variables are lagged by one period. Standard errors are clustered on factory to take into 
account repeated factory observations. 
Table 3 shows the results for the limited sample of factories producing for mass 
merchandisers and specialty retailers who are the original BFC members. Non-compliance 
items under Wage, Hours-Leave, and fundamental rights have expected negative signs 
while Contract, OSH-Welfare, Labour Relations have unexpected positive signs. The only 
category that reaches statistical significance is Hours-Leave (p<0.05). In other words, 
factories that violate fewer standards related to Hours-Leave tend to attract more 
reputation-conscious buyers in the following year. This may be because buyers like to 
source from factories that manage work scheduling well. On the other hand, factories that 
respect standards on hours and leave may feel they could increase their production 
capacity and try to attract more buyers to increase their capacity utilization. Nonetheless, 
lack of statistical significance, presence of unexpected signs and small R-squared prevent us 
from establishing a strong link between labour standard compliance of suppliers and buyer 
numbers.7 The findings suggest that considerations other than labour standard compliance 
are driving buyers’ sourcing decisions. 
 
                                                 
7
 The limited buyer data are likely to underestimate the actual number of each factory is producing for. Hence, 
the result may be biased against finding a significant link.  
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Table 3. Labour standard non-compliance and the number of original BFC buyers  
  # of Original BFC Buyers 
Number of non-compliance items under:   
Contract (lagged) 0.024 
  (0.019) 
Wage (lagged) -0.009 
  (0.014) 
Hours-Leave (lagged) -0.029** 
  (0.012) 
OSH-Welfare (lagged) 0.002 
  (0.005) 
Labour Relations (lagged) 0.006 
  (0.012) 
Fundamental Rights (lagged) -0.037 
  (0.100) 
Size of factory  0.478**** 
(Log of total number of employees) (0.146) 
Age of factory  0.071* 
(Number of ILO monitor visits) (0.038) 
Year controls Yes 
Constant -1.987* 
  (1.053) 
Number of observations 908 
R-squared (within) 0.092 
F-value  (12, 213) 
  4.35 
Prob>F 0.000 
    
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, ***<0.001.    
Robust standard errors in the parentheses.   
 
Next, to understand the characteristics of factories likely to retain buyers, I estimate a logit 
regression, where the dependent variable is a “long-term” dummy that takes the value of 
one when the buyer continues to source from the factory from 2006 to 2010. The sample is 
limited to the original BFC buyers because the duration of relationship for other buyers is 
unknown. Results reported in Table 4 show that the most significant predictors of long-
term relationship are the size and age of factory (p<0.01): larger and older factories tend to 
retain buyers longer. The size of the factory is likely to indicate the presence of firm 
network and firm capacity. The significance of age is not surprising given that newer 
factories could not be classified as long-term suppliers. The next most significant variable is 
the specialty retailer dummy (p<0.05): factories producing for specialty retailers are much 
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more likely to retain buyers longer than the suppliers of mass merchandisers, controlling 
for factory characteristics and labour standard compliance levels. This is consistent with the 
assumption that reputation-conscious specialty retailers prefer long-term relationship to 
better control their suppliers, given the rigorous standards they require.  
 
Table 4. Long-term relationship, buyer type, and labour standard non-compliance 
 
Long Relationship 
Number of non-compliance items under:     
Contract 0.021  0.031  
  (0.06) (0.06) 
Wage 0.016  0.004  
  (0.06) (0.05) 
Hours-Leave -0.007 -0.043 
  (0.05) (0.05) 
OSH-Welfare -0.043** -0.048*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
Labour Relations 0.033  0.031  
  (0.04) (0.04) 
Incidence of non-compliance with     
Fundamental rights -0.633** -0.563* 
(1=yes, 0=no) (0.32) (0.32) 
Suppliers of specialty retailers 1.015**   
(1=yes, 0=no) (0.40)   
Suppliers of mass merchandisers 0.202   
(1=yes, 0=no) (0.39)   
Size of factory  0.855*** 1.161**** 
(Log of total number of employees) (0.29) (0.28) 
Age of factory  0.226*** 0.236**** 
(Number of ILO monitor visits) (0.07) (0.07) 
Year controls Yes Yes 
Constant -0.725**** -0.873**** 
  (2.20) (2.15) 
Number of observations 1061 1061 
Pseudo R-squared 0.199 0.177 
Prob > Chi squared 0.000 0.000 
      
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001. Robust standard errors in the parentheses. 
 
As for labour standard compliance, OSH-Welfare and fundamental rights are significant at 
p<0.05 level with expected negative signs, meaning factories with fewer violations under 
OSH-Welfare and no incidence of violation of fundamental rights tend to retain buyers for a 
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longer period. It is interesting to note that non-compliance with Hours-Leave, which was 
significant for attracting buyers, lacks significance for retaining buyers. On the other hand, 
non-compliance with OSH-Welfare and fundamental rights, which were not significant for 
attracting buyers, gain significance for retaining buyers. It suggests that factors that attract 
buyers may well be quite different from factors that retain them, which requires further 
research. Non-compliance with Contract, Wage, and Labour Relations have unexpected 
positive signs.    
All in all, the regression results indicate a nuanced picture of how labour standard 
compliance may be related to supplier competitiveness. While non-compliance under 
Hours-Leave is found to significantly decrease buyer numbers, unexpected signs and lack of 
significance for other labour standards suggest that compliance is certainly not the only 
source of competitiveness and that non-compliance may well become a source of 
competitiveness in some cases. For instance, violations under Contract have unexpected 
signs for both attracting and retaining buyers though the association is not statistically 
significant. It is possible that factories abusing short-term contracts gain numerical 
flexibility and become more competitive than other compliant factories.  
Nonetheless, those factories respectful of OSH-Welfare standards and fundamental 
rights are more likely to retain buyers.  Moreover, it is important to note varying 
requirements and preference of different buyer types. New suppliers of reputation-
conscious buyers, specialty retailers in particular, have much higher compliance levels than 
others. Suppliers of specialty retailers are significantly more likely to be in long-term 
relationships than those of mass merchandisers, after controlling for firm characteristics 
and labour standard compliance.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
While the literature on labour standards in global supply chains has been growing, it 
has mostly focused on how to regulate suppliers through codes of conduct, monitoring, or 
other means, and few studies have examined whether and how better labour standard 
compliance might affect the competitiveness of supplier firms. While achieving compliance 
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is likely to incur cost, it may be offset by efficiency-enhancing effects of respecting labour 
standards and the possibility of attracting and retaining buyers. This paper has tried to 
shed light on the second lesser known aspect using the survey and firm-level data from 
Cambodia’s garment sector.         
The buyer survey results indicate that buyers do not reward better compliance and 
they verify the level of labour standard compliance before placing orders. Once orders have 
been placed, except for egregious violations of “zero-tolerance” issues such as child and 
forced labour, non-compliance rarely affects buyers’ sourcing decisions. In short, the 
question of labour standard compliance appears to figure more prominently at the pre-
order stage than the post-order stage. 
The data analysis suggests that better labour standard compliance is a necessary 
condition for producing for reputation-conscious buyers but not a sufficient condition for 
attracting them as other criteria such as price, quality, and delivery time are driving buyers’ 
sourcing decisions. Nevertheless, complying with OSH standards and respecting labour 
rights increases the supplier’s likelihood of retaining buyers.  
The data analysis has also shown diverging practices of different buyer types. 
Suppliers of reputation-conscious specialty retailers have better compliance performance 
than mass merchandisers, and they tend to retain buyers longer. This indicates specialty 
retailers’ preference for rigorous selection and long-term relationships. In other words, 
better compliance is a necessary condition to produce for specialty retailers that give 
higher margins and favour long-term relationships. Nevertheless, it does not follow that 
attracting and retaining reputation-conscious specialty retailers is the best strategy for all 
suppliers as they have different firm strategies and resource constraints. Rather, the 
findings suggest that if suppliers look to upgrade their competencies and seek to attract 
such buyers, improving labour standard compliance is a necessity.  
While the above findings are new, the result that better compliance does not 
automatically translate to more business is consistent with existing research showing that 
achieving compliance and obtaining certification has become a cost of doing business  
borne by suppliers (Ruwanpura and Wrigley, 2011; Stigzelius and Mark-Herbert, 2009). 
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There is scope for buyers to share the burden through offering long-term contracts or 
guarantees for stable orders, if not premium prices or increased orders.  
One of the limitations of this paper is that the buyer information is not available for 
the full sample, reducing the scope of inquiry and the power of inference. Nonetheless, the 
study covers the majority of buyers in terms of export volume and the core message is 
unlikely to be affected by this. Another limitation relates to the lack of separation between 
the direct effect of buyers’ labour standard requirements and the indirect effect of other 
requirements such as quality. The observed compliance level of the supplier is likely to 
reflect a combination of the two effects rather than the sole effect of the buyer selecting 
the supplier’s level of labour standard compliance. Moreover, the direction of causality 
remains undetermined for relationship and compliance levels.  Notwithstanding these 
caveats, this paper makes an important contribution to the literature on labour standards 
in global supply chains by investigating the link between labour standard compliance and 
competitiveness of supplier firms from the perspective of attracting and retaining buyers.   
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